TEST TUBE REPUBLIC: Chemical Weapons Tests in Panama and U.S. Responsibility

VII. Information and Documents on Chemical Weapons: The U.S. Record

        The complete transfer of canal-area lands under the Panama Canal Treaties by December 31, 1999, creates a key historical moment. Panamanians will soon have full sovereignty over and responsibility for these properties. Because the lands have been under United States control for more than 90 years, most Panamanians have little or no idea of their history of use, especially the history of military activities, which have typically been kept secret. A responsible reversion of these lands must include the transfer by the United States government to Panama of all historical documents related to activities that have had impacts on canal area lands.

        The record of information transfers to date falls considerably short of that goal.

        According to Panamanian officials and records, the Government of Panama has repeatedly and formally requested documents from the United States on chemical weapons tests in Panama. On January 28, 1997, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested a series of documents including one on "Detection Chemical Agent, Nerve Vapor." Project numbers were noted in the request. On August 1, 1997, the Ministry broadened its request for information to documents on chemical weapons tests generally.78 The Ministry also requested relevant portions of a list of "suspected overseas burial sites," which was written as an annex to the November 1993 "Survey and Analysis Report on all U.S. Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel sites."79

        But according to Foreign Ministry officials, the United States had not given Panama a single document on chemical weapons programs conducted in Panama -- until July 1998, as this report was in preparation.80 At that time, the United States released to Panama copies of the four nerve agent test reports cited above. In all other cases, U.S. military officials have responded with brief letters describing chemical warfare activities in general terms. In response to the ministry's August 1, 1997 request, for example, Colonel Debow wrote two paragraphs on tear gas and VX nerve agent tests.81

        In June 1997, the Fellowship of Reconciliation also requested portions of the 1993 annex listing suspected overseas chemical munitions burial sites. The request, made for the section of the document that dealt with suspected sites in Panama, was denied. The denial was appealed in July 1997, and the appeal was denied in May 1998.82

        The reasons given for denying the annex on "suspected overseas burial sites" are instructive. The Army General Counsel's Office stated that the document is correctly classified "because the requested material contains information concerning weapons systems and information of a foreign government, and the information could assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction."83 In other words, the Army may be conceding that the chemical agents abandoned in Panama have not simply "dissipated" into a harmless state or even into a militarily useless condition.

        If persons with bad intentions obtained still-usable chemical munitions from burial sites or other chemical dumps in Panama, they could cause havoc. But this offers an equally compelling reason for the United States to disclose to Panama the locations of chemical agents or munitions, in order to forestall the possibility of accidents.

        The U.S. military has already disclosed information on locations of other suspected burial sites, including in the United States. For example, the second edition of the Survey and Analysis Report includes a 13-page chapter on Water Island, located in St. Thomas and the site of the San Jose Project after it left Panama, from 1948 to 1950. The report lists a likely burial site, three suspected burial sites, and two possible burial sites, and includes a map of the sites.84

        The Department of Defense's problems with disclosing historical information about its activities are systemic. Dugway Proving Ground, located in Utah, served as headquarters for chemical weapons field tests (and was the controlling agency for chemical weapons programs in Panama in the 1950s). During the course of this study, Dugway's technical library conducted a "key-word search" of documents referring to Panama, Tropic Test and several other key-words or phrases. The result was 2252 documents referring to Panama in either their titles or abstracts. To both facilitate and narrow our search for documents, the Fellowship of Reconciliation sought permission to visit the Dugway library. Although Dugway's legal and intelligence offices approved the request, the base commander subsequently denied it, citing "extremely heavy testing and troop training ongoing at Dugway."85

        Aberdeen Proving Ground, in Maryland, which served as headquarters for U.S. chemical warfare programs for many years, also has a technical library and historical office. According to a former project manager of the Tropic Test Center who has been contracted by the Defense Department to research TTC's projects in Panama, the Aberdeen library is open only two hours a day, and his request to use the library was denied as well. His research, and delivery to Panama of its results, are likely to be delayed months by Aberdeen's restrictions.86

        In other words, the U.S. military's current operations -- at least in this case -- take precedence over the historical research necessary to be held accountable for the military activities in the past.

78 Letters from Lic. Ramiro Castrejón, Co-chairman, Environmental Sub-committee, DEPAT, to Col. Michael Debow, Co-chairman, Environmental Sub-committee, U.S. Army South, on January 28, 1997 (CCj-053-97) and August 1, 1997 (CCj-388-97).
 
79 Interview with author, Lic. Sayda de Grimaldo, Regional Interoceanic Authority, June 24, 1998.
 
80 Dr. Rodrigo Noriega, Director for International Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, note to author, June 8, 1998; and interview with Lic. Ramiro Castrejón, June 1998; communication from Fernando Manfredo, Jr. to author, July 20, 1998.
 
81 Debow, op.cit.
 
82 Letter from Fellowship of Reconciliation to U.S. Army, April 25, 1997; denial letter from U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, May 13, 1997; appeal of denial by Fellowship of Reconciliation, July 19, 1997; phone conversation between Suzanne Council, Office of the Army General Counsel, and the author, Fellowship of Reconciliation, May 1, 1998; denial letter of appeal from Army Principal Deputy General Counsel, Lawrence M. Baskir, May 20, 1998.
 
83 Lawrence M. Baskir, Principal Deputy General Counsel, Department of the Army, letter to author, May 20, 1998.
 
84 U.S. Army Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, "Survey and Analysis Report, Second Edition," December 1996, pp. VI-1 to VI-13.
 
85 Col. John A. Como, Commanding Officer, letter to the author, June 24, 1998.
 
86 Blades interview, op.cit.   
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