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Deseret News
Monday, May 8, 1995
SECRECY WAS THE NORM, NOT EXCEPTION
New documents show government sought to avoid lawsuits, bad PR.
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The government quietly developed and followed a policy to keep human
radiation experiments secret whenever they might merely bring
embarrassment, new documents show. While some instances of that were
revealed previously, President Clinton's Advisory Commission on Human
Radiation Experiments had assumed they were occasional exceptions to
rules - since agencies said for years that secrecy was allowed only to
protect national security.
But documents it released Monday showed instead that key agencies
quietly proposed and followed formal rules to keep under wraps
anything that might simply bring bad publicity or lawsuits.
Of course, many such secret experiments occurred in Utah - including
radiological weapons tests at Dugway Proving Ground and tests that
measured the health effects of fallout from atomic blasts upwind in
Nevada.
Clinton appointed the advisory committee to look into the safety,
ethics and extent of such Cold War experiments.
Other documents released Monday also show the government intentionally
exposed soldiers to more radiation at the Nevada Test Site than it
then considered safe for others, gave soldiers incorrect data on
radiation and used trinkets and placebos to encourage Marshall Islands
natives to cooperate in radiation studies when they began to question
them.
The new documents show that manuals for the Manhattan Project - which
developed the atomic bomb - allowed keeping secrets not only for
national security but whenever release might "cause serious injury to
the interests or prestige of the nation."
Following that tradition, the acting manager of the Atomic Energy
Commission in 1947 proposed a formal policy to keep secret any tests
that "would be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the nation"
or that would "cause administrative embarrassment."
The advisory commission said it could not determine whether that
policy was formally enacted but found many signs that it was followed
- including a 1947 AEC document that gave examples of types of data
that should be classified.
It blessed keeping secret any tests that might lead to lawsuits from
people involved and any radiation tests involving humans.
The advisory commission also noted it previously released other
documents showing that reports of many radiation experiments were
reviewed not only for national security concerns but also if they
might cause lawsuits or public relations problems.
It released another one on Monday: a 1948 memo from an AEC division
chief saying a University of California radiation test had to be kept
secret because it could not be rewritten so that it "would not
jeopardize our public relations."
In other documents, officials were shown to decide to expose soldiers
watching atomic blasts in Nevada to more radiation than was then
considered safe for other test site workers.
A summary of a 1951 conference showed Army Brig. Gen. James Cooney -
who had led the AEC's Division of Military Applications - urged
changing "radiologic defense thinking away from the infinitesimal
`tolerance' doses used in industrial and laboratory practice and
towards vastly larger military acceptable doses."
He recommended "acceptance of 100 roentgens for a single exposure and
25 roentgens weekly for eight weeks for repeated exposures." For its
own workers, the AEC then allowed 0.3 roentgens a week, not to exceed
a total of 3 roentgens for any one test.
A year later, the Army decided troops could be exposed to a maximum of
6 roentgens at a single test, of which no more than 3 roentgens was
prompt, whole-body radiation. It decided volunteers could also be
exposed to a maximum of 10 roentgens at a single test. Soldiers were
then sent on maneuvers at blast sites.
Other documents also showed soldiers at the Nevada Test Site were
given incorrect data as they were indoctrinated on how safe it is for
the infantry to enter areas after atomic blasts.
For example, documents show they were told it would be "not dangerous
at all" for troops to enter an atomic blast area "within a day" after
a bomb was detonated at 2,000 feet altitude - which the military says
now is wrong depending on the bomb's yield.
Troops also were told it would be safe to enter a bombed area "right
after the explosion . . . if you wore regular field clothing," which
the military now also says is false depending on a bomb's yield.
It also told soldiers no ships used at atomic tests near Bikini Island
had been sunk because they were too radioactive to be used again -
which was false.
Other documents also show AEC officials considered using placebos and
gifts to persuade Marshall Islands residents to cooperate with
research after their islands were irradiated during a March 1954
hydrogen bomb test.
When the Marshallese began to ask why they were continually studied if
they were not sick - as government scientists claimed - scientists
sought ways to keep them participating in tests measuring effects of
radiation on them.
A Dr. Charles Dunham wrote in 1958 that "we should consider giving
them more treatment (for other illnesses) or even placebos" to
convince natives they were receiving something of value.
A 1959 AEC memo also said, "One of the best ways of maintaining
rapport with the Marshallese is by medical and surgical therapy. . . .
Medical and surgical procedures carried out by our team were greatly
appreciated. . . . Every effort must be made to expand this aspect."
It also showed the AEC considered giving drugs and equipment and other
"inducement gifts" in exchange for cooperation. |
