|
Worries by outside scientists that civilians might be hurt by Army
weapons tests that spread radioactive dust to the Utah winds almost
shut down that program before it began in 1949, newly declassified
documents say.
But Army officials persuaded the safety panel - including former
University of Utah President A. Ray Olpin - to go along with their
plans.
Olpin then urged secrecy and caution to ensure Utahns didn't discover
the tests.
Those are among many new disclosures about radiation weapons tests in
Utah contained in hundreds of pages of secret documents just
declassified by the National Archives at the request of The Associated
Press and made available to the Deseret News.
Still, many other archives documents from the files of the Armed
Forces Special Weapons Project relating to those tests remain secret
and unavailable.
Other disclosures include that some tests may have occurred over the
Great Salt Lake; a whopping 1,584 bomblets were planned for use in one
test to spread a huge 100,000 curies of radiation (6,667 times more
than the radiation released by the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor
accident); and tests were envisioned to develop radiation defenses,
but developed weapons instead.
The documents also fill in many questions about the radiological
warfare program from 1949 to 1954 - such as why it began, why Dugway
was chosen for tests and why the program was apparently abandoned.
Its existence was secret until last year. Piecemeal disclosures since
then by government and the Deseret News have identified at least 74
radiation tests at Dugway Proving Ground. President Clinton formed an
advisory committee to study the ethics of those and other radiation
tests.
Civilians endangered
Before those tests began, a panel of scientists was formed to study
whether they would be safe to civilians and livestock. It was chaired
by Dr. Joseph G. Hamilton, director of the Crocker Radiation
Laboratory at the University of California.
Even though Army officials described him as "one of the original
proponents of the use of RW (radiological warfare)," Hamilton opposed
the planned use of radioactive tantalum-182 because he felt it
remained radioactive too long and could be easily scattered - creating
risks to people and wildlife.
He proposed the use of other material instead - such as irradiated
gold, which has a half-life (the time required for material to lose
half its radioactivity) of 2.7 days compared to 117 days for
tan-ta-lum-182. Tantalum was also a more powerful emitter of
radiation.
The safety committee agreed with him - and for a time blocked the use
of tantalum. Army officials said that was unacceptable, and convened a
conference at Dugway with the safety panel on Aug. 2, 1949, to discuss
differences.
Hamilton later wrote that "after considerable discussion," the panel
was convinced that use of tantalum would be safe under described test
conditions - and approved it.
Exactly how worried the Army was about Hamilton's opposition is shown
in a secret memo written three days after the conference by C.B.
Marquand and S.C. Hardwick of the Army Chemical Corps, who had acted
as secretaries to the safety panel.
They said his opposition meant "that the Chemical Corps program for
the development of munitions was in jeopardy if not completely
blocked. It appeared as if all of the time, effort and money
previously expended would be lost."
Not surprisingly, they wrote that the conference to change the panel's
opinion "was highly successful and quite gratifying to the special
projects personnel involved." The first tests began three months
later.
Olpin warning
Amid panel discussions, documents show that University of Utah
President Olpin made clear he worried about people and livestock
entering nearby areas - not so much because of safety problems, but
because they might accidentally discover the tests.
Hamilton wrote that Olpin believed the tests would present little
danger, "but the adverse effects of having public attention drawn to
such a situation would be most deleterious to the program."
Olpin also warned that because of the uranium boom, "Utah is being
very carefully combed by a large number of prospectors armed with
Geiger counters. Needless to say, it is imperative that such
individuals be denied the opportunity to survey any region containing
a perceptible amount of radioactivity arising from the various
radioactive munitions that are to be employed."
That may have helped contribute to the tight secrecy around the tests
that lasted 44 years.
Such secrecy also seemed to ignore a Nov. 20, 1950, recommendation by
a panel on the status of radiological warfare that the "public be
informed concerning the nature and potentialities of radio-lo-gical
warfare as well as possible countermeasures so as to avoid the
possibility of panic should an enemy carry out attacks."
Great salted lake
Among other disclosures in the new documents is that some tests may
have occurred over the Great Salt Lake - not just at Dugway.
An outline of information presented by Army officials seeking Air
Force assistance at a Feb. 4, 1952 meeting, notes numerous small
munitions called "dust generators" that spread tantalum were dropped
"from April through November 1951 in the Great Salt Lake water range."
It notes they were follow-ups to 50 groups of similar arms "dropped in
the water range at Army Chemical Center" on the Chesapeake Bay in
Maryland.
The only similar tests in that time frame discussed in previous
documents were the drop of nine such arms from airplanes over Dugway
on Nov. 3-4, 1951.
Small arms, big test
The same report may also solve some mystery about a test previous
documents had said was planned for May 1954, that would spread 100,000
curies of radiation - or more than all other known Dugway tests
combined.
Other documents had not said exactly what kind of test it was. New
documents show the Army wanted to have one airplane spread 1,584 "dust
generators" at the same time to contaminate a large area.
Each spherical generator was the size of a hand grenade and spewed
radioactive tantalum as it spiraled toward Earth. The Army was seeking
Air Force help to develop a system to eject the bomblets and to
provide adequate shielding for the airplane's crew.
Whether the test actually occurred is unknown, but a 1989 Army study
evaluating possible dangers on test ranges assumed it did.
New documents show the Army planned even bigger tests - including one
"final operational test" using between 1 million and 10 million
curies. In comparison, the Three Mile Island accident released about
15 curies of radiation.
Best defense is a good . . .
Documents also show officials originally sold the testing program as
needed to develop defenses against possible radiological warfare by
enemies. But its main focus was soon developing good offensive
weapons.
An Oct. 10, 1947, letter to the Atomic Energy Commission from the
chairman of the committee overseeing the program said, "Even though
our interest in the problem be entirely defensive, competent study may
not be fruitful unless work on the offensive possibilities be also
carried out."
Other documents have shown that only a couple of tests were carried
out to test decontamination or shielding measures. But dozens of tests
were conducted to refine and develop working radiological bombs.
Why Dugway
A May 26, 1949, secret memo from Air Force Gen. R.C. Coup-land also
showed that the Air Force once objected to the use of Dugway for the
radiation tests. He preferred the use of Eglin Field, Fla., or Camp
Erwin, Calif., saying they had better facilities.
But documents show Dugway was selected because of chemical and germ
warfare tests already under way there, and the possibility of using
their crews for radiation work.
A 1952 document said early tests there were conducted with "makeshift
facilities," but noted a new $1.5 million radiation facility there was
under construction which would even be used "for certain agent
processing" - or irradiation of material.
What purpose
Documents also give the first real glimpse into what sorts of uses
radiological weapons may have had - and the fact they were never
really intended for use against enemy troops in the field.
"Primary targets for RW (radiological warfare) are the economic
potential within enemy-held territory which will be useful to
ourselves upon occupation either during, but more likely after the
war," a 1952 Army document said.
It envisioned attacking steel mills, railways, strategic beachheads,
bases or even entire cities to force evacuation - but allow use later
after radioactivity had dispersed. Officials could choose how long
radioactivity would last by the type of material they spread and their
differing half-lives.
Documents say they could not be used as a tactical weapon against
troops in the field because troops move too quickly - and could easily
escape radiation.
Some tests at Dugway that exploded different shapes of arms from
towers were also designed to contaminate areas from which U.S. troops
were retreating to prevent use by an enemy.
Why abandoned
Documents also show why the program was apparently abandoned in the
mid-1950s - although other documents have suggested some such tests
also may have occurred in the 1960s.
The weapons had several problems. First, they could not be stored long
because of relatively short half-lives of materials used. Bombs would
have to be made just before they were used.
However, atomic, chemical and even biological weapons could be stored
for long periods.
And little radioactive material was available. As a 1950 report by an
oversight committee said, "RW agents in useful amounts can be obtained
only at the expense of fissile material used to make (atomic) bombs" -
and it felt manufacture of atomic bombs was more important.
It noted, "The production of sufficient RW agent to attack 15 to 20
square miles of urban area would utilize neutrons which could have
been used to produce one or two A-bombs."
And, of course, radiological weapons were only of limited use in an
actual war and useless in "situations where casualty production in a
matter of hours or days is essential or against mobile enemy units,"
the 1950 oversight committee said.
On top of that, continued testing had become expensive - and Congress
had slashed much of its budget.
|
